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Introduction
Since its inception, the U.S. legal system has evinced a meaningful commitment to the protection
of property. 1 This work explores why certain property, specifically information technology and
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Thanks go to the following bright
and hard-working Washington College of Law students: Irene A. Firippis, Lauren Diane Garry, Nicole
Irwin, Laura C. Lanso, and Timothy Valley. Thanks also to Dean Claudio Grossman for his
encouragement and support and to Microsoft, Inc. for assistance with student funding.
1
Even though the focus of this work, protection of private property from non-governmental parties, lacks
an explicit home in the Constitution, the idea of protection of private property is central to our concept of
justice. See John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE
ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT at 123, in John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, at 267, 342 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Locke’s influence on
the U.S. legal system is hardly controversial – and Locke asserted that protection of private property is the
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intellectual property (IT and IP), is so difficult to protect when used, stolen, or pirated by a
foreign entity or individual. It is not a question of the wrongfulness of IT or IP theft. Intentional
misconduct of this type is readily condemned and subject to sanction under U.S. law and the
laws of most other countries as well. For those sanctions to work, however, victims of such theft
must have access to a robust, effective judicial system, and the court or other enforcement
agency in that system must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The focus of this work is on the difficulty of securing personal jurisdiction (in personam
jurisdiction) over non-U.S. defendants in U.S. courts. Given the fact that remedies for IP and IT
theft are difficult to secure under the legal regimes of many growth markets -- which collectively
account for the bulk of goods available to U.S. consumers -- unless those who steal IT and IP can
be brought before a U.S. court or made subject to the authority of a U.S. state or federal agency,
they will be unaccountable, an unacceptable and all-too-common occurrence with devastating
social and economic consequences.
I. The Cost of IT and IP Theft
The value of stolen IT and IP is staggering. A recent White House study suggests the cost is as
much as a trillion dollars over the last decade. 2 Looking just at theft of domestic IP and IT by
foreign entities, a standard estimate of annual loss is in the neighborhood of $200 billion. 3 While
sources vary regarding actual annual losses, at the low end is an estimate of $58 billion – and $1
trillion at the upper end. 4 An OECD report tracking losses eight years ago found “international
responsibility of government. See also Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 17 (1985) (relying on John Locke and noting that the purpose of the
Constitution was “the protection of private property [that] Locke considered the purpose of government");
Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 535 (2000)
(explaining that while John Locke urged the preeminence of property, “protection of private property . . .
[it is not an] absolute in the U.S. legal system”); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Republicanism and Radicalism in
the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 153, 172 n.13 (1962).
2
White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and
Communications Infrastructure, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf at 2 (noting that
losses in 2008 alone could be as high as $1 trillion).
3
Neal Asbury, EU Turns Its Back on Intellectual Property Theft, Money News, Jul. 19, 2012,
http://www.moneynews.com/NealAsbury/EU-Intellectual-Property-Theft/2012/07/19/id/445817,
(estimating the losses at $200-$250 billion).
4
Fed. Bureau Of Investigation, Intellectual Property Theft, (Dec. 2012) http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (estimating the cost as “billions of dollars a year” noting that “much of
the theft takes place overseas . . . .”; Sen. Bob Casey, Report by the U.S, Congress Joint Economic
Committee, Chairman’s Staff, Senator Bob Casey, Chairman, (Aug. 2012),
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e387150a3bb62be; Bus. Software Alliance, Eighth Annual BSA/IDC Global Software 2010 Piracy Study,
(May, 2011) (http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2010/downloads/study_pdf/2010_BSA_Piracy_StudyStandard.pdf); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and
Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, (May 2011),
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (losses attributable just to Chinese theft of IT in 2009
exceeded $48 billion); Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Estimating the Global Economic and Social Impacts
of Counterfeiting and Piracy, (Feb. 2011) http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/bascap/,
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trade in counterfeit and pirated products could have been up to USD 200 billion in 2005. . .” 5 A
2011 International Trade Commission Report found that IT theft in China alone exceeded $48
billion.6 An International Chamber of Commerce Report found, “the total magnitude of
counterfeiting and piracy worldwide is estimated to be well over US$600 billion. . . .” 7
In the wake of this radical diminution of the value of IT and IP, incentives for creativity,
invention, innovation, and efficiency falter. If left unsolved, the problem of IT and IP theft
threaten established and nascent businesses, large publically traded companies and start-ups – in
short, the core of the U.S. economy. The theft of IT and IP not only harms the creators of that IT
and IP, it also perverts the marketplace, devastating U.S. companies that respect the rule of law
who are undercut by those selling and using products made with stolen IT or IP.
The notion of a fair and equal treatment, in this instance making foreign entities subject to the
same rules and sanctions as domestic entities, i.e., a level playing field in the marketplace, is
deeply embedded in our culture. Abraham Lincoln famously noted that among the goals and
purposes of civil government was, “that each of you may have . . . an open field and a fair
chance for your industry, enterprise and intelligence. . . .” 8 Achieving that “open field” and “fair
chance” in the IT and IP fields, given the prevalence of theft of that property, will require
aggressive judicial and regulatory action in state and federal venues. 9
(placing the value of losses at $200 billion); Bus. Software Alliance, Eighth Annual BSA Global Software
Piracy Study, (May 2010) http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2010/;
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, (2007)
http://www.oecd.org/industry/industryandglobalisation/38707619.pdf, (annual losses from IT and IP theft
are at least of $200 billion); Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S.
Economy, INST. FOR POL'Y INNOVATION (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/thetrue-cost-of-copyright-industry-piracy-to-the-us-economy.
5
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy - Executive
Summary, 4 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf,
6
U.S. Firms Report Losing Sales, Profits, Royalties, and Brand Reputations Due to IPR Infringement in
China Says US ITC, USITC (May 18, 2011),
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2011/er0518jj2.htm.
7
Intl’ Chamber of Commerce, In 2004, ICC launched the Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and
Piracy (BASCAP) to combat product counterfeiting and copyright piracy worldwide,
http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/bascap/.
8
Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the 166th Ohio Regiment on August 22, 1864
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/ohio.htm.
9
In addition to questionable protection through the courts, IP and IT owners who have U.S. copyright
protection cannot assert those rights beyond the borders. Copyright entitlements do not extend
extraterritorially, compounding the problem of IT and IP theft outside the U.S. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, 568 U.S.___, ___S.Ct.___, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2371 (March 19, 2013) (providing no relief to
copyright holders for foreign “first sales” followed by domestic resale of U.S. copyrighted books);
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–98 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (copyright laws simply do not apply to infringing acts outside the U.S.); United
Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U. S. 260, 264 (1908) (the “force” of copyright laws do not
extend outside the territorial United States); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73
(2d Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that copyright laws generally do not have extraterritorial
application.”); The Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial operation.”).
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Unfortunately, the legal problems associated with those actions, specifically the restrictive and
complicated rules for in personam jurisdiction – the focus of this paper – stand in the way of just
and appropriate remedies. Without legal recourse, IP and IT owners lose almost incalculable
value, the whole of the U.S market suffers, and, over time, millions of jobs will be lost. 10
Given the magnitude of the harm caused by stolen IT and IP and deeply held beliefs regarding
fairness and equal treatment, one would think U.S. courts would be anxious to protect those
harmed by overt misconduct. The U.S. legal system, however, has failed to resolve the in
personam jurisdiction conundrum and thus has not provided a reliable mechanism to hold
accountable foreign entities that inflict real and tangible harms on U.S. companies and
consumers through their theft of IT and IP. Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently
characterized the law in this area as “splintered” noting that the Supreme Court, rather than
facilitating access to the courts, has muddled the law, announcing doctrine that is “wrong, or at
least misleading” hitting a “new low” in terms of providing a remedial roadmap for victims of IP
and IT theft. 11
The limits on jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign entities discussed in this paper have
allowed foreign IT and IP thieves to profit with impunity. Commenting on the difficulties
private parties face protecting their interests, Professor John Carey explained that “non-US
manufacturers who entrust their product to a [domestic] distributor with a goal of serving the
entire US market will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in every state in which their products
are sold. There is no doubt that foreign defendants will make vigorous use of that result wherever
possible. . . .” 12 Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently noted that foreign producers can
“insulate themselves from suit in the United States, irrespective of the injury caused [by
employing] a Pontius Pilate-like washing of the hands via [various] distribution scheme[s].” 13 In
short, if unchecked and undaunted by the threat of any meaningful legal consequences, theft of
IT and IP will continue and worsen.
II. Doctrinal Roadblocks to Securing Jurisdiction over Foreign Entities
When a deprivation of property occurs, historic and basic notions of justice require a remedy –
ubi jus, ibi remedium – where there is a right, there is a remedy. 14 How bizarre that such a
10

Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real Facts and Figures - The Research: Facts and Figures Illustrate
the Extent of Intellectual Property Theft, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-andfigures-]
11
Wendy Perdue Collins, What’s Sovereignty Got To Do With It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court, 63 SOUTH CAROLINA L. REV. 729 (2012).
12
John T. Perry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts
on J. Macintyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REV. 827 (2012).
13
Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR
L.REV.113, 156 (2012).
14
3 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966)
(1768) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded”), quoted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 163–66 (1803).
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fundamental principle falters and sometimes fails entirely when the entity engaged in the
misconduct is foreign.
At a very basic level, a foreign defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court when there
are sufficient minimum contacts to connect that entity with the forum state and when the
proceeding contemplated is fair. Given the harm caused by stolen IT and IP noted in the prior
section, regardless of the way one calculates losses, the damage is massive and the contact
anything but minimum. However, harm to victims has not been the common measure to
determine personal jurisdiction.
a. The Roots of In Personam Jurisdiction
For more than a hundred years, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide guidance to lower
courts on in personam jurisdiction over foreign nationals. 15 Two basic requirements emerged.
First, in light of the non-resident status of the defendant, the legal proceeding contemplated must
be reasonable and fair in terms of the convenience of the forum, availability of evidence and
witnesses, and other “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” fundamental to a fair
trial. 16 Second, there must be an adequate relationship or connection between the defendant and
the state, often framed in terms of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, factored by the
wisdom of asserting of jurisdiction over foreign entities, the efficiency of intended judicial
action, and respect for other legal regimes. 17
U.S. courts are appropriately cautious when their actions have implications for foreign affairs. 18
Additionally, principals of comity19 and deference to other sovereign states are appropriate. 20
However, the notion that U.S. courts are a hostile forum for domestic victims of misconduct by
foreign entities is troubling at best. The unavailability of a forum for an injured plaintiff has

15

Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) (noting,
“[i]n the absence of meaningful principles established by the Supreme Court, the lower courts search for
the significance of the Supreme Court's caselaw in snippets and phrases taken out of context and then
used as the basis for the courts' opinions”).
16
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940)); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 76–77 (1991).
17
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
18
See U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2 (vesting the power to conduct foreign affairs in the executive); U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing residual power to the legislature, but nothing in Article III suggests the
judiciary has a role to play in foreign affairs). The principles underlying the political question doctrine
urge caution when cases extend beyond the borders. See e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)
(stating that “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance”); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (announcing that
“[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative [and] not subject to judicial inquiry or decision”).
19
Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining comity in terms of
the respect foreign nations owe each other).
20
Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991).
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serious consequences, 21 and the notion that the “courthouse door is closed” can lead to the
degradation of clearly articulated rights particularly in the intellectual property field. 22
The starting point for discussing in personam jurisdiction is Pennoyer v. Neff. 23 Pennoyer
limited a state’s power to “extend its process beyond” its borders, 24 finding that a court cannot
assert in personam jurisdiction over a foreign entity unless there is a sufficient and meaningful
relationship with the forum state most easily established by personal service or actual presence.
In International Shoe v. Washington, 25 decided more than a half century later, the Court held that
states could extend their reach beyond their borders to out-of-state parties so long as there were
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum state as opposed to the actual presence or service of
process required in Pennoyer. 26 The question after International Shoe, of course, became one
assessing the fairness of the contemplated proceeding and the nature of the defendants’ contacts,
both from a quantitative (how much value, money, impact, investment, etc.) and qualitative (of
what type, legal interest, reliance, benefit from the forum state, etc.) perspective. 27
In the wake of International Shoe, two tracks emerged for in personam jurisdiction: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. 28 If a foreign entity has “substantial, continuous, and
systematic contacts” 29 with the forum state, a court can exercise general jurisdiction over that
entity. 30 A foreign entity with contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction is fully subject to the
laws of that state, much the same as an entity or individual domiciled in that state. General
jurisdiction requires a level of contact with a forum state that approximates physical presence. 31
21

Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (“[A] legal regime that
does not guarantee to all individuals that their claims of injustice will be heard sends a message of
disrespect and reinforces their sense of unworthiness. As a consequence, the unequal access to justice
yields a loss of legitimacy for the entire civil justice system and diminishes the acceptability of its
adjudicative outcomes.”)
22
Megan M. LaBelle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good 18 GEO. MASON L.
REV 43, 62 (2010).
23
95 U.S. 714, 732–38 (1877).
24
95 U.S. at 722.
25
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26
Id. 319.
27
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (holding that requisite minimum
contacts are required as a matter of Due Process).
28
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15 (1985) (contrasting
general and specific jurisdiction); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998).
29
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–19 (1984); Burger King Corp.,
471 U.S. at 472–73 (1985); Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir.
2006); Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989). The requirement of
substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts is not without criticism. See Meir Feder, Goodyear,
"Home," and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (arguing
that the standard is insufficient, and also challenging the validity of “doing business” as a meaningful
jurisdictional requirement); Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (1991) (challenging the legitimacy of
general jurisdiction and its conformity with Due Process).
30
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006).
31
Bancroft and Masters v. Augusta National, 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).

Forthcoming: Catholic University Law Review, Volume 63 Number 1 (2013)
Evidence of general jurisdiction would be the maintenance of a business facility, offices,
licensing, sales agents, advertising or promotion targeting a particular state, solicitation of
business, or other acts that evince long-term presence. 32
If the contacts are less pervasive than required for general jurisdiction, a court may exercise
specific jurisdiction over a defendant. 33 Specific jurisdiction exists when contacts, while not
substantial, continuous, and systemic, nonetheless reflect a conscious transactional engagement
in the state 34 coupled with a purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum
state. 35 Specific jurisdiction is transactional, case-specific, and unpredictable. 36 A set of
targeted sales that are part of a marketing strategy, advertising, or other direct and specific
relationships coupled with purposeful availment would probably be sufficient. 37
For those seeking redress for the U.S.-based harms caused by foreign IP and IT theft, specific
jurisdiction cases potentially pose a significant challenge. If a foreign entity has “set up shop” in
the forum state (having a place of business, employees, and localized marketing) and has a longterm, on-going business, it is likely that it is subject to general jurisdiction and can be held
accountable in court much the same as any resident of the state. In contrast, when products made
abroad using stolen IT or IP “appear” in a state and are sold by others, the challenge for victims
is to show that the sale or use of the product is not an incidental or sporadic transaction that
would be outside the requirements for specific jurisdiction.
The questions specific jurisdiction present are challenging, particularly for transactions that do
not involve extensive contacts, multiple sales, or long-term transactions. In McGee v.
International Life Insurance, the Court found a single sale or a single contact could be sufficient:
“[a] single purposeful contact is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction if the cause of action
arises from that contact.” 38 McGee was clarified months after it was decided by Hansen v.
32

Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 415.
The Supreme Court recently explained the distinction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citations omitted): “A court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) [defendants] when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction
. . . depends on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or
an occurrence that takes place in the forum State. . . . [S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of
“issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”
34
Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1992); North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning
Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1990); Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38701 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
35
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214 (5th Cir.
2012); Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 2004).
36
Lake Assocs. v. DNZ Products, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 3573892, at *5, (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2012)
(quoting Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1297 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit ‘has outlined a specific test
to follow when analyzing whether a defendant's activities within a forum are continuous and systematic.’
Instead, the ‘court must look at the facts of each case to make such a determination.’”).
37
Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
38
355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
33
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Denkla, 39 which shifted the focus from the notion of a single sale or transaction to the more
demanding set of tests found in International Shoe centering on fairness, minimum contacts, and
purposeful availment of the legal regime of the state. Hansen held that the plaintiff must show
that “the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws . . . .” 40
Twenty years later, the Court refined Hansen in Shaffer v. Heitner, 41 requiring that presence or
contacts of the defendant to be sufficient to meet the due process fair play and reasonability
requirements, and Kulko v. Superior Court, 42 reiterating the minimum contacts test and
discussing the interests of the plaintiff and the state. In cases of IT or IP theft, for specific
jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “purposely direct his activities at residents
of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or are related to
those activities.” 43 The conduct should be sufficient such that foreign national[s] should
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court . . . .” 44 These requirements suggest that the
conscious marketing choices and expectations of the defendant – the nature of the defendant’s
action – not the harm to the plaintiff, are the central considerations in determining the presence
or absence of in personam jurisdiction.
b. Asahi and Nicastro – the Plot Thickens
In 1987, the question of the nature of the sufficiency of defendant’s actions or contact with the
forum for purposes of in personam jurisdiction came to a head in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior
Court. 45 In that case, the plaintiff’s wife was killed when a motorcycle they were riding collided
with a tractor. The accident occurred in California and allegedly was caused by a defect in one
of the motorcycle tires as well as a defect in the valve in that tire. The tire was made by Cheng
Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese company, and the valve was made by Asahi Metal Industry Company,
a Japanese company.
About 20% of Cheng Shin’s U.S. sales were in California, and while there was some
disagreement between the parties, it is safe to conclude that a meaningful number of Chen Shin
tires sold in California had Asahi valves. Before judgment, the plaintiff settled with Cheng Shin
Rubber. Chen Shin then filed a cross-claim against Asahi in California seeking
indemnification. 46 Chen Shin asserted that the court had in personam jurisdiction over Asahi
based on the fact that Asahi could foresee the presence of its products in California and was
unquestionably aware that a meaningful number of its products were sold in California.
Asahi argued that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts because it had
insufficient contacts with the forum state, the trial would be highly inconvenient, an
39

Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
41
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
42
436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
43
Burger King, Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
44
Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
45
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
46
Id.
40
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indemnification claim could and should be litigated in Japan, and that it never contemplated
being sued in the U.S. Further, Asahi had no employees, offices, or real estate in California, nor
did it make direct sales or solicit business in California.
Based on these facts, the Court asked “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign
defendant that the components it manufactured . . . would reach the forum State [and enter] the
stream of commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State
such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” 47
The Court found that even if one assumes Asahi was aware of the California sales of the Chen
Shin products with the Asahi valves and the products were, broadly defined, in the stream of
commerce, Asahi did not “purposefully avail itself of the California market. . . . It [had] no
office, agents, employees, or property in California [and did not] advertise or otherwise solicit
business in California. It [was not involved in the] distribution system that brought its valves to
California.” Consequently, the Court found insufficient contacts to satisfy the Due Process
minimum contact rules. 48
On the question of fairness and substantial justice, the Court noted that since the defendant Asahi
was a foreign company (raising problems of convenience and witness availability) and since the
plaintiffs (Cheng Chin is the plaintiff in the cross-claim) were not California residents, the
interest of the forum state was limited. This is an important consideration for IT and IP theft
cases and suggests that an action against a foreign entity brought by a state resident or the State
Attorney General on behalf of all the state might be treated differently than an action brought by
a non-resident. As noted later in this paper, a state court has a powerful interest in hearing
claims brought by the State on behalf of its residents. The Asahi Court made clear this
distinction, finding that when there are minimum contacts and the plaintiffs are state residents (or
the state itself), “the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the
alien defendant.” 49
The Court concluded with guidance on the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign defendants,
noting concerns about fairness and convenience as well as international relations. Relying on a
1965 case, the Court cautioned that “[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending
our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.” 50 Nowhere in the Asahi opinion
does the Court suggest that similar care should be given to protecting the rights and entitlements
of domestic victims of wrongful conduct.
It is anyone’s guess whether the Court intended to re-write requirements for in personam
jurisdiction in an atypical case involving a component-part third-party indemnification dispute
between two foreign entities (one out-of-state and the other out-of-the-U.S.). This was not a case
47

480 U.S. at 105, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
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Id. at 112.
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Id. at 114.
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involving the rights of an in-state plaintiff harmed by the acts of a foreign defendant. Though
written by a divided court, 51 Asahi initiated a jurisprudential mudslide, dividing federal circuits
and state courts. 52 As became evident a decade and a half later, the rifts in Asahi are still present
on the Court and evident in the Court’s more recent Nicastro 53 and Goodyear 54 decisions,
discussed infra.
However one reads Asahi, it reflects abundant concern for foreign defendants and left domestic
plaintiffs with an uncertain burden. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion rejected the notion that
in personam jurisdiction necessarily can be found with single sales and limited contacts, even if
the contact or sales are foreseeable and intentional and even if such sales were in the “stream of
commerce” of the state. In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed, accepting the
argument that knowing and foreseeable placement of a product in the “stream of commerce” of a
state is adequate for purposes of in personam jurisdiction. The O’Connor perspective could
make it difficult for victims of foreign IP or IT theft to “hale” into court a foreign defendant who
merely uses or sells, on their own or through a domestic retailers, goods made with stolen IT or
IP. The Brennan perspective makes such cases more viable – but Brennan’s opinion was not
endorsed by a majority of the Court in the primary opinion in the case. As the next section
indicates, the split between these two points of view persists.
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In 2011, the Court decided J.McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 55 a case that raised many of the
questions posed and only partially answered in Asahi. During the course of his employment,
plaintiff Robert Nicastro, a New Jersey resident, sustained permanent disabling injuries to his
hand while using a machine manufactured by the British company, J. McIntyre Machinery. The
machine was imported into the U.S. by an Ohio company and then sold to Nicastro’s employer.
J. McIntyre Machinery had sold four machines to New Jersey companies, intended its machines
to be sold in the U.S., sent trade representatives to U.S. trade shows, held U.S. patents on its
products, and, through a U.S. company, advertised its products in the U.S. In short, the goods
were intended for U.S. use and had entered the U.S. stream of commerce.
A plurality of the Court held that while the defendant benefited from U.S. commerce, it had not
“personally avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
[not invoked] the benefits and protections of its laws.” 56 Even if the goods were in the state’s
stream of commerce, the plurality found a defendant (1) must target the forum state and (2)
purposely avail itself of the rights and protections of that state. The plurality held that a
defendant’s actions in seeking the protection of the forum or using its laws was the proper
measure of the sufficiency of the contacts with the state, not the foreseeable presence of their
products.
While the case could have clarified the confusion left by Asahi, the Court was unable to make a
crisp and clear statement to guide future courts. The case was decided by a plurality and rejected
(to the extent a plurality can be dispositive 57) the idea that a targeted, foreseeable sale in a state
on its own is sufficient for in personam jurisdiction. If the best that can be said is that a product
is in the stream of commerce and foreseeably made available for sale in the forum state, the
Nicastro plurality found that insufficient for purposes of specific or general jurisdiction. 58
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Nicastro that while the foreign “[m]anufacturer
permitted, indeed wanted, its independent American distributor to sell its machines to anyone in
America willing to buy them,” it was unfair to hale the defendant into court without more
extensive contacts with the forum state. 59 Justice Breyer noted his concern for small foreign
defendants who have caused injury to persons in the U.S. He characterized as “unfair” making
foreign defendants accountable in court, expressing concern about the burden of making foreign
entities “understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the wide variance in the way
courts within different States apply that law.” 60 Deep concern for fairness to foreign defendants
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dominates the opinions 61 – and one is hard-pressed to find an equal concern for U.S victims of
misconduct. Further, just how this is any more unfair than it would be for out-of-state domestic
defendants who cause injury is not part of the dialogue. Interests that are so fundamental –
specifically IP or IT created by a U.S. entity or person – ought not be so difficult to protect.
III. Misconduct, Minimum Contacts, and Maximum Confusion
As just discussed, there is abundant precedent detailing when courts are prohibited from
exercising jurisdiction over foreign defendants, raising this obvious question: Do clear and
uniform criteria exist to indicate when it is permissible for a court to protect the interests of those
victimized by foreign entities and individuals?
There is logic to the notion that if a product is foreseeably present in the U.S., designed for
domestic sales, that should be sufficient for finding in personam jurisdiction over a foreign user
or seller. However, the plurality in Nicastro found a single transaction or isolated sales of a
product is insufficient to support jurisdiction – even if the presence is foreseeable. 62 Instead, a
regular flow of goods in a particular jurisdiction must be coupled with actions demonstrating that
the seller or manufacturer availed themselves of the market opportunities and the rights and
protections of the legal system in the forum state. 63 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro
also suggests the importance of evidence of special domestic customer lists that the foreign
manufacturer has developed, coupled with property the manufacturer owns, employees the
foreign manufacturer retains, or proof of other tangible resources. 64 It is not hard to imagine that
foreign manufacturers that steal IP and IT and then sell their products through U.S. wholesalers
and retailers often will have little need for the indicia of state contacts suggested both the
plurality and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro.

a. Domestic Subsidiaries
Given the profitability of those involved with IT or IP theft and the difficulties associated with in
personam jurisdiction, it is worth asking whether the minimum contact problem might be solved
if the seller or user in the forum state is a subsidiary of a foreign parent company. 65 If the
61
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subsidiary is owned and fully controlled by the foreign parent, the chances of haling the parent
into a U.S. court increases. However the corporate relationship is articulated, because the
minimum contact rule is about personal jurisdiction, there must be something about the parents’
personal contact with the forum state – not just the subsidiary’s contact.
In Hargrave v. Fiberboard, 66 the court held: “Generally a foreign parent corporation is not
subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing
business there; the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant
the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign parent.” The parent must exert “domination and
control of its subsidiary [such that] they do not in reality constitute a separate and distinct
corporate entit[y] but are one in the same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction . . . .” 67
The problem, of course, is that foreign entities engaged in IT theft or using stolen IT in the
production of goods are probably smart enough to keep their subsidiaries separate or to use
independent sellers within the United States with whom they have no formal long-term corporate
ownership relationship. In Hargrave, the court found that a domestic company can be construed
as a dependent subsidiary based on the amount of stock of the subsidiary the parent controls, the
extent to which they share headquarters, officers, director, corporate formalities, accounting
systems, and overall authority for the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary. 68 Looking broadly
at IT and IP theft over the last decade, it is not clear how many parties involved in these cases
would meet that test.
b. Non-affiliated Users or Sellers
Outside of a parent-subsidiary relationship, the rules begin to blur, depending on the state and the
circumstances. Illinois for example, has a fairly broad (and somewhat unique) interpretation of
the elemental fairness requirements in personam jurisdiction. Recently those standards were set
out in Russell v. SNFA.: “To determine reasonableness, courts consider the following factors: (1)
the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum states’ interest in resolving the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interest of the effects forums, including the forum
state, in the most efficient resolution of the dispute; (5) the interests of the effected forums in the
advancement of substantive social policies.” 69 For the minimum contact formulation, Russell is
one of a handful of post-Nicastro cases following Brennan’s stream of commerce theory.
The Russell case involved a deadly 2003 Agusta helicopter crash. The helicopter was built in
Italy, with parts made in France, exported through a German company, and ultimately ended up
in Illinois where the accident occurred. 70 The court found it noteworthy that the defendant
SNFA did “not deny that it knew that Agusta helicopters were sold throughout the United
States… [and did] not deny that it knew Agusta had an American subsidiary for purposes of
distribution….” Relying on the reasonable foreseeability of the presence of the product - thus
satisfying Brennan’s stream of commernce test – the Illinois court exercised jurisdiction over the
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foreign defendants. That the defendant knowingly accessed the legal system of the state or
contemplated and planned to benefit from that system was not established, thus diluting the
overblown importance of conscious availment in Nicastro. Unfortunately, Russell is the
exception, not the rule.
Similar to Russell is Willemsen v. Invacare, 71 a post-Nicastro opinion from Oregon. Plaintiff’s
mother was killed in a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the battery of her motorized
wheelchair. Plaintiffs are Oregon residents. Invacare built the wheelchair at its Ohio plant. The
battery was manufactured by CTE, a Taiwanese company. CTE made its batteries pursuant to
contract specifications set by Invacare and agreed to indemnify Invacare for liability resulting
from problems with the battery. CTE disputed the finding of personal jurisdiction, claiming that
much like Asahi, local courts in its domicile (Thailand) were more convenient. CTE argued
further that there were insufficient contacts with Oregon to satisfy the requirements for in
personam jurisdiction set out in Nicastro.
The Oregon court disagreed, suggesting that neither Asahi nor Nicastro provided a clear signal
on critical personal jurisdiction questions. The court found that when “a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds . . . .” 72 Freed from the most restrictive parts of the
plurality in Nicastro, the court found an adequate relationship between the state and the
defendant CTE. This decision was based on the number of sales and the indemnification
agreement that suggested CTE anticipated a role in legal proceedings, thus meeting the availment
requirement. The court noted as sufficient “a regular course of sales” or “regular . . . flow” of the
defendant’s product into the forum state. 73 The court found such activities can form a foundation
for specific jurisdiction since one could conclude that under these circumstances, a foreign
defendant “anticipated the need to defend against the very sort of claim that the plaintiffs [filed
in this case]. . . .” 74
The Willemsen court held that it does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice” to exert jurisdiction over a foreign company that benefits from sales in a state, foresees
those sales, and therefore, anticipates the potential of liability from those sales. 75 Foreseeability
of presence is a logical factor to consider – and one that is not the norm. 76 Outside of cases like
Russell or Willemsen or subsidiary relationships that meet the criteria mentioned above, victims
of IT or IP theft are left with the uncertainty of Asahi and the negative text of the Nicastro
plurality. 77 For many items produced abroad using stolen IP or IT and designed for sale in the
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U.S., if the most that can be said is that they are foreseeably present, in personam jurisdiction is
unlikely to be found. As noted earlier, per Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, 78 foreseeable
presence, simpliciter, is insufficient for minimum contacts.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion has generated a quarter century of debate and a pronounced
conflict between the circuits. 79 As the dissenting opinion in Nicastro points out, the post-Asahi
measures of in personam jurisdiction leave something to be desired. Contact with a forum, if
measured by marketing strategies, employees, property, advertising, and access to or benefits
from the legal system of the state, have nothing to do with the selling price of a product – yet
courts use both the value of sales, selling price, and the volume of sales to measure the
sufficiency of contacts. As Justice Ginsburg noted: “By dollar value, the price of a single
machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of
flannel shirts, see Nelson v. Park Indus. Inc., 80 cigarette lighters, 81 or wire-rope splices, 82 the
Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.” 83 Consider that
benefitting from the market available in a particular state was translated into “targeting” a forum
state – and targeting was measured by bulk sales and price, this seems hardly a rational approach.
The question of whether stream of commerce, foreseeable presence, or something more is
required has been answered differently by courts. Professor Angela McLaughlin recently studied
the variation – or more accurately, disagreement – between the circuits. 84 Based on her research,
she concluded that the First Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Second Circuit is inconclusive,
the Third Circuit is inconclusive, the Fourth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Circuit
follows Justice Brennan (with some qualifications), the Sixth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor,
the Seventh Circuit appears to follow Justice Brennan, the Eight Circuit appears to follow both,
the Ninth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Tenth Circuit follows both, the Eleventh Circuit
follows Justice Brennan, and the Federal Circuit has declined to decide the question. 85 For
victims of IT or IP theft, this disconcerting discord generated by Asahi and Nicastro only adds to
the instability in the field and suggests that conventional protection of property rights is
unavailable or unreliable in Article III courts.
Much of the controversy generated by Asahi involves disagreements around the importance of
knowing placement of a product into the stream of commerce of a state. The problem in Justice
O’Connor’s opinion is not one of clarity: “The placement of product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed at the forum state.” 86
It is the implication that is troubling. Consider that under this formulation, deciding to sell goods
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in the forum state and then selling those goods is not sufficient to make a company or a seller
subject to the laws of that state.
Justice Brennan’s Asahi view differs fundamentally on the meaning of stream of commerce:
“[S]tream of commerce refers . . . to the regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that the
final product is being marketed in the forum state the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come
as a surprise. . . . A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits
economically from the retail sale of the final product in forum state, and indirectly benefits from
the state’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. . . .” 87 Under this formulation,
deciding to sell goods in the forum state and then selling those goods is probably sufficient for in
personam jurisdiction. The problem, however, is that this formulation is outright rejected by the
plurality in Nicastro. 88
According to Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro (writing for himself, Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas), Justice Brennan was simply wrong. 89 According to the dissent in Nicastro, Brennan
was on the right track 90 – and yet, as of today, to be blunt, there is no track. This dissonance
enables courts, if they chose, to chart their own path on the question of in personam jurisdiction.
The language of a recent case from the New Mexico Court of Appeals reflects the void:
“Because J. McIntyre Machinery did not produce a majority opinion adopting either Justice
O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's stream of commerce theory, [we] adhere to our [in-state]
precedents, at least until the United States Supreme Court resolves the twenty-five-year-old
uncertainty over whether stream of commerce theory is sufficient to establish the required
minimum contacts and, if so, how it should be applied.” 91
A federal court in Georgia has a similar approach: “The Supreme Court has held that “placing
goods into the stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers within the forum State’ may indicate purposeful availment” [quotes omitted]. . . .
[citing Nicastro]. [However, in] Asahi . . . four Justices believed that a defendant must do
“something more” than merely deliver its product into the stream of commerce . . . . [citing
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi]. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has declined to reconcile the two
approaches.” 92
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Prior to Nicastro, courts had begun to use the Brennan stream of commerce test more liberally. 93
Since that decision, however, courts have been less inclined. 94 For example, in Dow Chemical
Canada v. Superior Court 95 the court focused on an O’Connor-like view of purposeful
availment and targeted activities conducted within the forum state and denied in personam
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the foreseeable presence of the defendant’s product in the forum
state. In Van Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft, 96 the court applied Nicastro, finding that “predictable”
contacts were insufficient. The court noted that there was a distinct difference between the
predictability or foreseeability that the defendant’s goods would be sold in the state and those
instances where the defendant “can be said to have targeted the forum.” Whether foreign
manufacturers that produce goods made with or using stolen IT or IP target a particular state will
be difficult to predict in many if not most cases.
While it seems only fair that victims should be able to bring a claim in any state where they have
been adversely affected, the targeting requirement remains an obstacle to accountability. 97 In
Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Systems, 98 the federal court, interpreting both New Jersey and
Supreme Court jurisprudence, found that while “Nicastro does not clearly or conclusively define
the breadth and scope of the stream of commerce theory … Nicastro stands for the proposition
that targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum states.” 99
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In short, Nicastro has left litigants in a state of confusion. 100 One commentator notes that
Nicastro “left long-standing questions about personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers
foggy…” 101 The Supreme Court does not seem inclined to lift the fog and clear the air.
IV. Calder and the Effect of Intentionality on In Personam Jurisdiction
A different way of thinking about the problem above is to take a step back and consider the
underlying substantive act: theft, which is undeniably an intentional act of misconduct.
Characterized as IP and IT thieves, defendants fall in a special jurisdictional category:
jurisdiction over perpetrators of intentional misconduct. Intentional acts causing harm are
simply not in the same category as negligent acts and they allow for a different jurisdictional
calculus. 102 In the plurality opinion of Nicastro, after referring to the Shirley Jones libel case,
Calder v. Jones, 103 the Court recognized the distinction and held as follows: “[I]n some cases, as
with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the state’s authority by reason of his
attempt to obstruct its laws.” 104 The Nicastro decision’s reference to Calder raises a
fundamental question: since theft of IT or IP is an intentional act, what would prevent a court
from recognizing “Calder-effect” jurisdiction as a basis to exert in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign manufacturer using stolen IT whose products are exported to and sold in the United
States?
a. The Calder Doctrine
Calder-effect jurisdiction permits courts to provide a remedy for acts of intentional misconduct
where the jurisdictional focus is more on the act performed outside the forum state that causes
harm within the forum state rather than on the Asahi/Nicastro commercial connection of the
defendant to the forum. 105 To be clear, Calder does not apply to “untargeted negligence” and
does require a case-by-case assessment of the intentional act in question to determine if the
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aiming requirement is met. 106 While Calder was a libel case, 107 courts have recognized that
“[t]he Supreme Court did not intend the Calder ‘effects' test to apply only in libel cases.” 108
Given the unquestionable condemnation of intentional misconduct, courts should be more
inclined to protect their residents from the domestic harms arising from such misconduct (even if
the misconduct occurred abroad), particularly if no other domestic forum is available for the
resolution of their claims. This principal is recognized in the Restatement (2nd) of Conflict of
Laws: “When the act was done with the intention of causing the particular effect [in the state],
the state is likely to have judicial jurisdiction though the defendant has no other contact with the
state. This will almost surely be so when the effect involves injury to person or damage to
tangible property.” 109
In Guidry v. United States Tobacco, 110 the court found that the commission of an intentional tort
“within the state, or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state,
[constitutes] sufficient minimum contacts within the state by the defendant to constitutionally
permit courts within that state, including federal courts, to exercise personal adjudicative
jurisdiction over the tortfeasor and the causes of actions arising from the offenses or quasioffenses.” Some courts have held that even a single intentional act giving rise to injury in a
forum state can be sufficient for a finding of minimum contacts under Calder. 111
Unfortunately, Calder-effects jurisdiction is not perceived uniformly by courts or
commentators. 112 Some courts have found Calder-effects jurisdiction requires more than one act
and may not be a substitute for a finding of minimum contacts demonstrating purposeful
106
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availment within the forum state. 113 Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson recently discussed
Calder-effects jurisdiction, urging against an expansive reading. 114 She noted that the Supreme
Court “has not revisited” Calder jurisdiction since its decision in 1984 and questioned whether a
misunderstanding of Calder could lead to circumvention of basic procedural requirements
established for in personam jurisdiction. She referenced Nicastro, noting that the exception for
intentional torts remains unclear, though reasonable minds can differ on this point. 115
b. Aiming and the Brunt
The most apparent challenge with applying Calder to a foreign manufacturer’s theft of IT,
however, is how to address the express “aiming” component for such IP or IT theft. 116 Calder
requires that the acts of the defendant are aimed at or target the forum state. 117 Some years ago,
the Second Circuit held that if a defendant has “reason to believe” that its intentional misconduct
would cause harm in a particular state, that might suffice to satisfy the aiming requirement in a
Calder-effects case. 118
Theft of IT or IP has highly predictable consequences. Products made with stolen IP or IT have
a lower cost of production and, therefore, have the potential to artificially undercut costs incurred
by, and prices offered by, a company that respects property rights and uses legal IT in its
operations. This results in a market distortion and is harmful to both competitors (who abide by
the rule of law and pay for their IT and IP) and to competition generally (since firms, in order to
gain a competitive advantage, will -- at least on the margins -- invest greater resources into
stealing IT and fewer resources into innovation, product improvements, etc.). This will be true –
and quite foreseeable – in any state where goods made through IT or IP piracy enter the stream
of commerce. Whether recognition of this pernicious effect satisfies the aiming requirement is an
open question.
In Calder, the fact that the source of the libel (the National Enquirer) had large circulation in
California, the state in which plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit, was sufficient for the Court to
find that the defendant had “aimed” at California or could anticipate being haled into court in
that state. 119 Using that reasoning in the case of IT or IP theft, if goods produced by a foreign
defendant made with or using stolen IT or IP have significant sales in one state, the defendant
should anticipate being haled to court in that state. The problem is that the goods in question in
113
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many cases of IT or IP theft are sold in many states. Does that mean there is Calder-effects
jurisdiction in all states where the product is sold – or only in those states where the sales are
substantial? Since the Supreme Court has not clarified the meaning of Calder, one can only
surmise what the outcome might be in any particular case.
Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, explained that “perpetrators of intentional torts can ‘anticipate
being haled into court’ in the place where the targets of their wrongful actions reside.” 120 The
11th circuit is one of the few to address the question of intentionality and aiming in Calder. In
Licciardello v. Lovelady, 121 the court found that the Calder-effects test is focused on
intentionality and purposefulness and not on the intention to have a specific effect in a particular
forum. Licciardiello suggests that it is perfectly reasonable to hale into court a defendant who
engages in intentional misconduct – indeed, it is foreseeable. 122
The Calder opinion itself does not resolve the question of the extent to which a defendant must
aim its misconduct at a particular jurisdiction. 123 Instead, it made the assumption that intentional
misconduct creates a separate category for the assessment of jurisdiction without resolving the
meaning “express aiming.” 124 Thus, not surprisingly, opinions vary regarding aiming in Caldereffects cases. 125 In IMO Industries v. Kiekert, 126 the court found that a forum state must be the
“focal point” of the intentional misconduct of a defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of
Calder-effects jurisdiction. The Third Circuit then surveyed other circuits and found a similar
perspective in the first, fourth, fifth, eight, and tenth circuits. 127
An important contrast to IMO is Cole v. Tobacco Institute. 128 In that case, the defendant, a nonU.S. tobacco company, evinced knowledge of potential liability in the U.S. and employed
personnel who knowingly perpetuated fraud regarding the risks of tobacco use. Based on these
120
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circumstances, the court rejected the notion of a precise focal point as a requirement for “express
aiming,” finding instead that a defendant could not escape the jurisdiction of the court if its
wrongdoing covered multiple jurisdictions. Cole held that when a defendant’s misconduct is
aimed at the entire United States, there are sufficient minimum contacts in every state. 129
The Cole court referred to Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Phillip Morris, 130 which
interpreted Calder as follows: “The fact that the alleged intentional wrongful act was directed at
many states instead of just one should not have the result that [the defendant] cannot be sued
anywhere in the United States. . . . Rather, under Calder, the fact that . . . the defendant aimed its
alleged wrongdoing at the entire United States gives it the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ with
each state for that alleged wrongdoing where [it] caused injury.” 131 While the case law on this
point is limited, it makes little sense to allow a defendant to avoid accountability anywhere on
the premise that it caused multiple harms everywhere. 132
There is also a debate surrounding the question of whether Calder-effects jurisdiction requires
the forum state to bear the core or “brunt” of the defendant’s misconduct. 133 In Yahoo! v. La
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 134 the court found the quantum of harm was not the
appropriate measure for the sufficiency of contact in Calder-effects jurisdiction, holding that “it
does not matter that even more harm might have been suffered in another state.” 135 It makes
little sense to limit Calder-effects jurisdiction, in terms of the “brunt” requirement, solely to the
forum in which the most harm is felt. 136
Woven throughout the discussion of Calder is the notion of notice and foreseeability, both
central to the due process argument at the core of the minimum contacts debate. Calder, like
Asahi and Nicastro, posed the question of whether a defendant fairly can be brought before a
court of a particular state based on the foreseeability that the defendant’s actions might cause
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harm to an entity or an individual within that state. 137 The Court centered on the capacity of a
defendant to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” as a consequence of the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state. 138 In the case of the use of stolen IP or IT by foreign
manufacturers that export to the United States, an effect on competition and on competitors
within any state in which their products are sold is not just foreseeable, it is inevitable.
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Nicastro made clear that if a defendant’s misconduct is experienced
in numerous jurisdictions, courts in any of those jurisdictions ought to be able to protect the
citizens of those jurisdictions and find in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. 139 Caldereffects jurisdiction allows just that outcome and does not violate “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” 140 If the defendant reasonably anticipates being “haled into court, the
due process concerns begin to dissipate.” 141
While Calder-effects jurisdiction holds out potential for both owners of IT and IP whose
products are stolen as well as competitors who are affected adversely by such theft, conflicting
views of the case render it potentially problematic as a primary source of justice for victims of IT
and IP theft. In the end, the jurisdictional puzzle of Asahi, compounded by the multiple opinions
in Nicastro and the varying interpretations of Calder, make state and federal courts unreliable
fora to resolve such claims. 142 How then can the legal system protect the competitive market or
the interests of the owners of IT and IP? Two obvious approaches are state enforcement of
unfair trade of unfair competition laws and a federal enforcement action or the issuances of rules
or guidelines.
V. A Beginning: The First Two (of Hopefully Many) State Unfair Competition Cases and
the Potential for FTC Action
In December 2012, Ankour Kapoor reported on the problem of IT theft in the December 2012
ABA Antitrust Newletter. 143 He approximates that “more than $60 billion . . . of IT is stolen
each year.” 144 Citing the 2011 BSA Global Software Piracy Study, 145 Kapoor characterizes IT
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theft as “rampant” and “consequential.” 146 Because of the difficulties of securing jurisdiction by
conventional means, he acknowledged the value in action by state attorneys generals or a federal
regulatory agency. Kapoor suggests that the theft of IT followed up with sales of products
derived from such stolen property would be within Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act 147 and would be sufficient to allow the FTC to take action against foreign entities. Thus far,
the FTC has taken no direct action.
State attorneys general, on the other hand, have begun to respond. As Kapoor notes, in
November 2011 eighty percent of the attorneys general in the United States signed a petition
urging the FTC to take action designed to deter foreign manufacturers from using stolen IT, 148
and in two states, unfair trade or unfair competition cases have been initiated.
a. State Unfair Trade
In fall 2012, the first public state unfair trade case targeting stolen IP and IT was filed when the
Office of the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts initiated an action against Narong
Seafood Company pursuant to Massachusetts General Law 93A which prohibits unfair
competition. Based on statements of the Attorney General, Martha Coakely, 149 Narong used
pirated or stolen IT to produce its goods in Thailand and then exported those products to the
United States where they were sold in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Attorney General
declared that the use of unlicensed software in these circumstances was an unfair method of
competition and provided Narong with an unfair advantage over businesses operating in
Massachusetts that pay for their software. 150 Rather than fighting the claim, Narong settled,
paying a $10,000 civil fine and agreeing to cease the use of unlicensed or stolen IT or IP in
conjunction of the manufacture or sale of its products. In a statement issued after the case was
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settled, Attorney General Coakely stated that those “using unlicensed software should not gain
unfair cost advantage over rivals who play by the rules.” 151
In January 2013 California initiated two similar cases, California v. Ningbo Beyond Home
Textile, and California v. Pratibha Syntex. 152 California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris
warned as follows: “Companies across the globe should be on notice that they will be held
accountable in California for stealing our intellectual property.” 153 The Office of the California
Attorney General issued a press release making clear that suits of this nature are essential to
protect the interests of IP and IT owners and the competitive market as well as the State of
California which has lost 400,000 jobs and $1.6 billion as a result of the IP and IT piracy. 154
The contentions in the Ningbo complaint are direct and powerful. The complaint alleges that
foreign IT and IP theft give producers “a critical short-term advantage over their American
competitors by not paying licensing fees to software developers.” 155 The actions “can stunt the
development of . . . software” and thus flatten innovation and efficiency by U.S. technology
providers and U.S. producers and sellers. 156 Deprived of “competitive advantage[] . . .
[companies] may . . . downsize in the United States and relocate overseas, resulting in the
permanent loss of jobs and manufacturing in California and elsewhere.” 157
Consistent with the positions taken in this research, the Ningbo complaint notes that “state laws,
federal laws, and international treaties do not address the pernicious downstream effects of such
piracy. . . .” Given the insufficiency of private remedies, the Ningbo case could establish a
format for accountability. The State asserts that the “use of pirated software to gain a
competitive . . . can . . . be remedied by proscribing such tactics as an unfair method of
competition under California law.” 158 That potential exists in the vast majority of states. 159
The unfair trade and unfair competition laws of most states encompass the wrongs alleged in the
California and Massachusetts proceedings. 160 Every state has an unfair competition law, many
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quite similar to the statutes in Massachusetts and California. 161 State unfair competition laws
apply to stolen property and to circumstances where the competitive market is distorted and the
pricing structure compromised by unlawful acts. Foreign producers relying on stolen IT and IP
and domestic sellers aware of the theft can hardly claim that the pursuit of legal recourse through
the state comes as a surprise.
Although defendants might seek to skirt liability because of the complexity and uncertainty
generated by the in personam jurisdiction cases discussed in this work, state enforcement actions
targeting one or more aspects of foreign supply chains are a vital and legitimate alternative
approach to the problem. 162 Asahi and Nicastro have made it difficult for private victims of IT
and IP theft to secure a judicial remedy, but state enforcement cases have separate goals – the
state-wide protection of fair competition, innovation, creativity, and invention – and hopefully
will sidestep some of the problems of those cases. 163 As a Nevada court noted some years ago in
a case against the rock band Judas Priest, “[t]he exercise of jurisdiction [over a foreign entity] is
not unreasonable, because the state has a strong interest in protecting its citizens. . . . While it is
true that the members of Judas Priest will now be forced to defend a lawsuit in a country distant
from their own, it is more equitable to place such a burden on them, and not the plaintiffs,
because the band members consciously and deliberately chose to develop a world-wide
market.” 164
It hardly seems controversial to recognize that states have an interest in protecting their own
citizens. In Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Dist. Court In & for
Jefferson County, 165 the court recognized the importance of “plaintiffs' interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief. . . . [T]he plaintiffs would be hard pressed to pursue this litigation
in France. In addition, this state has an interest in providing a forum to its citizens injured by the
alleged tortious conduct of nonresidents.” In State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co.,166 the
court found”[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over [defendant] Sumatra . . . reasonable and fair.
While it may be inconvenient for Sumatra to travel to the United States to defend the action
against it, the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction outweighs any such inconvenience.”
Since the Massachusetts and California cases are among the first instances of state enforcement
of unfair trade or unfair competition statutes in IT and IP theft cases, it remains to be seen
161
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whether the broad interests of a state, as a complainant, will be accorded a more expansive
reading of the in personam cases jurisprudence discussed in the paper.
Although foreign producers and sellers who use stolen IT in their business operations might find
a safe haven in the jurisprudential chaos that comes in the wake of the Nicastro decision, they
should be answerable for their misconduct – and the state unfair trade and unfair competition
laws can serve that function. For example, North Carolina declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.” 167 Regular use of stolen goods to gain an unfair competitive advantage over those
who abide by the law, obviously falls within the reach of that provision. Iowa and Missouri both
prohibit “unfair practices” 168 with a goal of preserving and protecting the competitive market. 169
These laws hold out the potential of deterring 170 misconduct throughout the supply chain, even if
they may not uniformly provide a meaningful private remedy. 171 That said, simple fairness
suggests that “[o]ne who has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a
commercial product should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ‘reap what
he has not sown’.” 172 By the public implementation and enforcement of these statutes, the gain
for private victims, 173 at a minimum, is the benefit, downstream, of a vibrant competitive market
environment. 174 Some states conceive of these claims broadly (“all statutory and non-statutory
causes of action arising out of business conduct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial
or commercial matters. . .” 175) while others do not. 176 One thing is clear: thus far, the potential
167
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for private claims related to IT and IP theft based on current case law, outside of cases brought
by state attorneys general, has not substantially slowed down the rate of foreign piracy. 177 The
significant cost of investigation at home and abroad, litigation costs, and the complexities
associated with enforcement of judgments place this option beyond the reach of most victims. In
contrast, public unfair trade cases can address a whole range of misconduct, harness the
resources of a state attorney general, and do not require a showing of a personal harm.
Though the meaning of unfair competition varies, 178 theft of IT and IP is clearly illegal in any
conception of the term. 179 Moreover, once a case is properly before a court in an unfair trade
case, there is a good argument that the power exists to secure a remedy that includes non-U.S.
defendants, 180 and also an argument that remedies can be confined to property or interests in the
forum state only. 181
b. The Federal Trade Commission
Another approach for dealing with stolen IP or IT and its effects on U.S. commerce would be for
the FTC to direct its energy to this profoundly unfair method of competition pursuant to Section
5 of the FTC Act that condemns “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.” 182 The power of this legislation allows the FTC to “consider[] public values beyond
simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.” 183 Those
values certainly include condemning as unfair theft of IT and IP, whether by foreign or domestic
176
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entities. Moreover, the power of the FTC extends beyond domestic borders 184 if the foreign
action has “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. markets. 185
The FTC could also conduct a rulemaking designed to create standards for supply chain review
by domestic sellers or, without going to the time and expense of a rulemaking, issue guidelines
that establish criteria to make clear the obligation of domestic importers and sellers to determine
if foreign providers are relying on stolen IP or IT. 186
The FTC could also initiate enforcement actions, targeting domestic sellers, importers, or foreign
entities that sell products manufactured by companies that use stolen IT or IP in their business
operations. 187 Such enforcement would be particularly justified with respect to manufacturers
located in jurisdictions in which meaningful remedies for IT theft in the local courts are difficult
to obtain.
In order to carry out their legislative mandate, federal agencies must, from time to time, reach
beyond the territorial United States in order to protect domestic interests and ensure
accountability. A recent SEC action reflects this approach and addresses the in personam
jurisdiction question as follows: “Although it might not be convenient for Defendants to defend
this action in the United States, Defendants have not made a particular showing that the burden
on them would be “severe” or “gravely difficult.” . . . [I]f the SEC could not enforce the FCPA
against Defendants in federal courts in the United States, Defendants could potentially evade
liability altogether.” 188 To turn a blind eye to practices that cost U.S. entities hundreds of
billions of dollars each year borders on abdication. At a bare minimum, the issuance of “best
practices” standards or guidelines – both of which can be done at a low cost and with a minimum
of process, would be a step in the right direction and would send a powerful message.
A substantial report on the problem of IT and IP theft was recently released by the White
House. 189 It was developed with the input of the following agencies: the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the
Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the U.S. Copyright Office. 190 Notably, the FTC
was not involved. The report urges the establishment of mechanisms to secure supply chains and
recites the accomplishment of various domestic and transnational entities to address the
184
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problem. 191 Based on this report, the commitment of federal resources seems substantial – and
an invitation for the FTC to engage in the effort.
VI. Concluding Perspectives
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently examined the problems with in personam jurisdiction
generated by both the Nicastro case (discussed earlier) and its companion, Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operation v Brown. 192 After noting the failure of the Court to craft meaningful guidance to
deal with international defendants in product liability cases, Professor Simpson-Wood noted that
one can only hope that in the future the Court will adopt “a more expansive view of general
jurisdiction.” 193 She suggests that stream of distribution or stream of commerce theories should
suffice “sans the minimum contact analysis.” 194
Like Nicastro, Goodyear 195 did nothing to simplify the problem of dealing with foreign entities
engaged in misconduct that has a pernicious effect and negative consequences for the U.S.
economy. If anything, it rendered more difficult the task of plaintiffs who are victims of foreign
IT or IP theft by “clarifying that the overly complicated stream of commerce theory of personal
jurisdiction does not apply to general in personam jurisdiction analysis.” 196 Even when
confronting egregious misconduct, including the charge of overt violation of human rights, the
191

2011 U.S.I.P. Report at 18-19:
“Tracking and Reporting of Enforcement Activities: DHS seizure . . .for counterfeit pharmaceuticals rose
nearly 200 percent to 1,239. The overall number of DHS IPR seizures rose 24 percent to 24,792.
Counterfeit and pirated goods seized via express carrier services increased by 16 percent over FY 2010
and 65 percent over FY 2009. Counterfeit consumer safety and critical technology merchandise seizures
rose 44 percent in FY 2011 to more than $60 million. FBI initiated 235 IPR investigations, made 93
arrests, secured 79 indictments, and obtained 79 convictions. . . . DOJ saw sentences resulting from its
prosecutions of IPR crimes increase in severity, with a doubling in the number of sentences of 60+
months and a tripling of sentences of 37-60 months. . . . Nine partner agencies including criminal
investigative agencies from the DOD and NASA as well as the FBI, ICE HSI, and CBP launched
Operation Chain Reaction. This is a coordinated and comprehensive initiative targeted to curtailing the
flow of counterfeit items into the U S Government supply chain. CBP led a year-long initiative within the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals . . . in coordination
with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO), and law enforcement in 81 countries. . . .”
192
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); Taylor Simpson-Wood, In
the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L.REV.113, 156 (2012).
193
Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR
L.REV.113, 156 (2012).
194
Id.
195
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation, at 2851 et. seq. (In Goodyear, plaintiff was killed in a bus accident
in France. The plaintiff’s parents alleged that the accident was the result of a defect in tires produced by
defendant Goodyear in North Carolina and then sold primarily for use outside the U.S. The tires were not
sold in North Carolina. The court found that for corporate liability in cases of this nature “the paradigm”
for the “exercise of general jurisdiction” and the focus is on the jurisdiction “the corporation . . . fairly
regard[s] as at home.”).
196
S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the
Ship of Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, (2012).

Forthcoming: Catholic University Law Review, Volume 63 Number 1 (2013)
Court has seemed unwilling to declare the U.S. courts a friendly forum when the defendant is
foreign. 197
Another commentator, Professor Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, is likewise critical of the Court’s
failure to provide guidance on legal standards or relief to those who are victims of misconduct by
foreign entities. 198 Rhodes characterizes the decisions of the court in Nicastro and Goodyear as
“embracing a rigid formalism” and making use of a “fictional basis” for jurisdictional limitations
that frustrate the legitimate interests of those entitled to relief in the United States. Rhodes notes
that the court has long rejected the notion of “doing business” as a basis for jurisdiction, 199
perhaps necessitating legislative action to address the deeply problematic uncertainties in the
field. 200
A comment in the Fordham Law Review recently observed: “[I]n a global economy, where a
manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell them in as many places as possible, it is not
unfair to subject that manufacturer to suit in a place where it hopes, but does not necessarily
anticipate, to do business.” 201 The logic and fairness behind this position is clear. As one court
noted: “[I]n this age of WTO and GATT one can expect further globalization of commerce, and
it is only reasonable that companies that distribute allegedly defective products through regional
distributors in this country. . . anticipate being haled into court by plaintiffs in their home
states.” 202 Unfortunately, that reasoning does not appear in Asahi, Nicastro, or Goodyear.
Hope for a viable and reliable theory for victims of IT and TP theft after Nicastro and Goodyear
seems faint at best. Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently wrote about both cases,
finding the Court sharply divided on critical jurisdictional questions. 203 Looking at the opinions
of Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsberg in Nicastro, Dean Purdue characterizes the assertions in
both opinions regarding jurisdiction to be simply incorrect. She argues that Justice Kennedy’s
position in Nicastro “suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants have a liberty interest in not
being subject to the governmental authority of the state with which they have not affirmatively
affiliated themselves.” 204 She goes on to note that “Kennedy apparently believes that states have
no power or authority separate than what is conferred by the defendant.” 205 This position takes
“party autonomy” to a new and troubling level. While courts have long recognized that parties
197
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may agree to apply the law of a particular state when entering in to a contract, the options do not
include selecting no law, no state, and no accountability. 206
It is hard to see another way to read cases like Nicastro, leaving most victims of overt IT and IP
theft without a clear path to secure justice in the courts, outside the reading of Calder suggested
earlier. Public enforcement or regulatory action at the state or federal level can sanction those
engaged in this misconduct and send a clear message regarding the public will to address the
problem.
Assuming the Supreme Court is disinclined to back away from Nicastro, unwilling to switch
gears and adopt Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce approach, and unlikely to revisit Calder
clarifying the unresolved aiming issues, one remaining option for improving the possibility of
private relief is federal legislation that enables injured parties better access to U.S. courts. Thus
far, that approach has not fared well in Congress. 207 In my view, a legislative solution is fair,
constitutional, and necessary. 208
Whether such legislation has a political future is another question. In 2010, the last time a bill
was submitted to address these problems, it died a quiet death without ever coming to the floor of
the House. 209 However, the idea is solid and responds to Justice O’Connor’s invitation in Asahi:
“Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize
federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national
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contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal
court sits.” 210
In the absence of federal legislation, protection of basic property rights compel state unfair trade
enforcement along the lines of the Massachusetts and California proceedings discussed in this
work or FTC action. Those avenues must be pursued and widened. Governmental initiatives of
this type will stimulate innovation, creativity, invention, and produce incentives for efficiency.
They will have a stabilizing effect on the competitive market. Finally, they can help avoid the
loss of another trillion dollars in the next decade.
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